This paper considers undiscounted two-person, zero-sum sequential games with finite state and action spaces. Under conditions that guarantee the existence of stationary optimal strategies, we present two successive approximation methods for finding the optimal gain rate, a solution to the optimality equation, and for any E > 0, E-optimal policies for both players.
return optimality equation (see Section 1), under conditions that guarantee the existence of a stationary AEP.
In view of the fact that the value of (both the discounted and undiscounted version of) the game does not necessarily lie within the same ordered field as the parameters of the problem (see Bewley and Kohlberg [2] ) we cannot expect to find a finite algorithm in the sense that it involves a finite number of field-operations.
Two algorithms were given by Hoffman and Karp [13] and Pollatschek and Avi-Itzhak [17] . It was shown that the first algorithm converges to a stationary AEP, if the tpm of each pure stationary policy pair is unichained and has no transient states. Although the second algorithm seems to compare favorably with the first one, as far as net running time and the required number of iterations is concerned, it is still unknown under which conditions its convergence is guaranteed.
In this paper, we provide two successive approximation methods for locating optimal policies for both players. In both algorithms, we obtain in addition at each step of the iteration procedure, upper and lower bounds for the asymptotic average value which coniverge to the latter as the number of iteration steps tends to infinity.
The first algorithm is an adaptation of a "modified" value-iteration method as introduced by Bather [1] and as generalized by Hordijk and Tijms [14] . Its convergence is guaranteed whenever condition (Hi) below is satisfied. (Hi): (a) a stationary AEP exists.
(b) the asymptotic average value g * is independent of the initial state of the system. The second algorithm is based upon the more elementary value-iteration method, and may successfully be applied whenever condition (H2) below holds: (H2): the tpm of each of the pure stationary policy pairs is unichained.
Note that (H2) = (HI) (see e.g. [7] , Theorem 3). Under (H2) we obtain in addition lower and upper bounds for the fixed point v * of the optimality equation which in this case is unique up to a multiple of 1, where 1 is the N-vector with all components unity.
At each step of the procedure, both methods merely require the solution of N relatively small linear programs (the size of which is determined by the number of actions in K(i) and L(i), i E 2). Especially for large scale systems, i.e., when N >> 1, this compares favorably with the techniques used in [13] and [17] which require at each step of the procedure the solution of a system of at least N equations.
One might wish to extend these methods to the more general stochastic renewal games-model (SRG) in which the state of the system is not necessarily observed at equidistant epochs. In the SRG-model we make the more general assumption that when the actions k E K(i) and 1 E L(i) are chosen in state i, the period of time until the next observation of state is a random variable with finite and positive expectation TVl (i E S2; k E K(i), 1 e L(i)). In the one-player case, this model reduces to a Markov renewal program (MRP) (see Denardo and Fox [6] and Jewell [15] ). The value-iteration methods that were developed for the discrete-time or Markov decision problem .(MDP) case, could easily be extended to the MRP-model, due to a data-transformation which was introduced in Schweitzer [20] and which turns every undiscounted MRP into an equivalent MDP. In the two-player case, the analog of this data-transformation, will generally fail to work. The only exception is provided by the case where the expected holding times Tb' (i E 2, k E K(i), 1 L(i)) satisfy the separability assumption: (SEP)T*" aik/3i1 with atik, /i > 0; i E ?, k E K(i), 1 E L(i). (1) This will be shown in the appendix, Section 4. (1) holds e.g. in case the transition time between two successive observations of the state of the system merely depends upon the current state, possibly in combination with the action chosen by one of the two players. Establishing an efficient algorithm for the general SRG-case remains, however, an outstanding problem.
In Sections 2 and 3 we present our two methods, and in Section 1 we give some notation and preliminaries. In addition, under either one of (I), (II) or (HII), any solution pair (g, v) has g = g*, and any policy pair (f*, h*) E 1 x ' which satisfies the equation (7), i.e., which attains the N equilibria in (7) simultaneously for some solution pair (g, v), is an AEP.
NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES
Finally, let V= {u E ENI(g*, v) satisfies (7)3.
A MODIFIED VALUE-ITERATION TECHNIQUE
Throughout this section, we assume (HI) to hold, which implies in view of Lemma 1, the existence of a solution pair (g *, v *) to the optimality equation ( Observe that the sequence {y(n)}n=j cannot be computed in view of g* being unknown. We circumvent this numerical difficulty as in White [25] , i.e., we define the sequences {5 (n)})=i and {G(n)})=1 by: We summarize this section by specifying an algorithm which approximates g*, as well as a solution v E V, and which finds for any e> 0, Eoptimal policies for both players: Algorithm 1
Step 0. Fix a sequence {rn})'1 satisfying (9) and (10), e.g., take r = n-b with 0 < b ? 1. Set n = 0, fix y(O) E EN andE > 0. Step 1. Calculate y(n + 1), D(n + 1), G(n + 1) and U(n + 1) from y(n), using (11), (12) and (13).
Step 2. If U(n + 1) -D(n + 1) < edetermine a stationary policy pair (f,n hn) which attains the N equilibria to the right of (11) simultaneously; use fn(hn) as an E-optimal policy for player 1(2); G(n + 1) as an E-approximation for g* and y(n + 1) as an approximation for a solution v E V Otherwise increment n by one and return to Step 1.
VALUE-ITERATION; A SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR CONVERGENCE
In this section, we discuss the asymptotic behavior of the sequence:
where In this section we first apply a data-transformation which turns our stochastic game into an equivalent one, in the sense that the two stochastic games have the same gain rate vector for any stationary pair of policies, and hence the same asymptotic average value vector and the same set of stationary AEPs. We next analyze the behavior of (14) under condition (H2) which is a stronger versioni of (Hi) (see the introduction). The data-transformation is analogous to the one employed in Schweitzer [20] : {(fi, hi);.. *;(fN, hN)} and {(fi', hi');.. *;(fiN', hN')}:   EZ,N min[P(fN, hN)* .* P(fl, hD)j1j; P(fN, hN) 
APPENDIX: ON REDUCING UNDISCOUNTED SRGs TO EQUIVALENT UNDISCOUNTED STOCHASTIC GAMES
In the introduction, we pointed out that in the one-player case, successive approximation methods for Markov renewal programs could be obtained by transforming the MRP-model into an equivalent undiscounted MDP-model. When trying to obtain a similar reduction for the SRG-case, thereby establishing an algorithm to solve the undiscounted version of this game, it is tempting to consider the natural extension of the data-transformation that is used in the one-player case (see [20] 
such that (30) and (31) follow from the combination of (33) and (34).
We conclude that g*, v E V and E-optimal policies for both players can be computed by applying Algorithm 1 under (HI), or Algorithm 2 under (H2) to the transformed model and by exploiting the one-to-one correspondences exhibited by Lemma 6. Note in addition, that by choosing T strictly less than the upperbound in (27) the transformation in step 0 of Algorithm 2 becomes superfluous.
The above described reduction fails, if the expected holding times fail to satisfy (SEP). This is due to (30) and (31) breaking down in general, examples of which can easily be constructed. As a consequence, establishing an algorithm for the general SRG-case remains an outstanding problem.
